Gait recognition has a broad application in social security due to its advantages in long-distance human identification. Despite the high accuracy of gait recognition systems, their adversarial robustness has not been explored. In this paper, we demonstrate that the state-of-the-art gait recognition model is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A novel temporal sparse adversarial attack under a new defined distortion measurement is proposed. GAN-based architecture is employed to semantically generate adversarial high-quality gait silhouette. By sparsely substituting or inserting a few adversarial gait silhouettes, our proposed method can achieve a high attack success rate. The imperceptibility and the attacking success rate of the adversarial examples are well balanced. Experimental results show even only one-fortieth frames are attacked, the attack success rate still reaches 76.8%.
Introduction
Gait recognition is designed to automatically identify people according to their way of walking. Compared to traditional biometric information such as fingerprints or irises, gait can be obtained at a long distance without the cooperation by subjects. Gait recognition is therefore widely applied in remote visual surveillance.
In recent years, plenty of gait recognition methods [Wu et al., 2016; Takemura et al., 2019; Wolf et al., 2016; have been proposed and achieved good performance. However, the robustness of gait recognition algorithms against malicious attacks has not been thoroughly studied. Very limited work [Jia et al., 2019; Gafurov et al., 2007; Hadid et al., 2012; Hadid et al., 2015] has studied the robustness of gait recognition to spoofing attacks, not to mention adversarial attacks which can fool most machine learning models without causing visual awareness. Recently, a large amount of studies about adversarial attacks have been investigated, including attacks on image classification [Szegedy et al., 2014; , object detection The middle row directly transfers adversarial attack methods in image classification to gait recognition, causing all frames perturbed and imperceptibility decreased. The bottom row has only the first two frames modified. Besides, the modified frames maintain a gait appearance, so it is not easy to distinguish whether they are adversarial examples or not from human vision. 2016], etc. But for gait recognition, for best of our knowledge, a meaningful attempt has not been found yet.
In this paper, we investigate the security of gait recognition by adversarial attacking. The main difference between adversarial attacks against gait recognition and other tasks, such as image classification or face recognition, is the imperceptibility of adversarial examples. Firstly, the input of gait recognition models is a sequence of silhouette frames, rather than a single image for image classification models. Furthermore, to better achieve the imperceptibility of adversarial examples, only a few frames are allowed to modify. Secondly, natural images of different categories are easy to distinguish by humans eyes, whereas the gait silhouette of different subjects is not that case. Thus motivated by unrestricted adversarial examples [Brown et al., 2018] , crafting an unrestricted adversarial gait silhouette better achieves imperceptibility than adding a norm-constrained perturbation to the original gait silhouette. For these two reasons, we propose our temporal sparse adversarial attack on gait recognition.
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The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first attempt to adversarial attacks on gait recognition. Experiments show the vulnerability of gait recognition systems.
• To evaluate the attack intensity properly, we define a new evaluation criterion by combining the l 1 norm in the time domain and semantic similarity in the spatial domain.
• We propose a novel temporal sparse adversarial attack method on gait recognition. Our attack achieves a high attack success rate and good imperceptibility simultaneously. 
Adversarial Attack
Let x ∈ R m denote an input to a classifier f : R m → {1, 2, ..., k}, and assume the attacker has full knowledge of f . The goal of adversarial attack is to find the corresponding adversarial example ., 2019] to generate an unrestricted adversarial image misleading a classification model. We also adopt the GAN-based architecture to generate adversarial high-quality gait silhouette. But, we extend it on the temporal domain. Instead of perturbing each frame, we sparsely generate adversarial frames to alert or insert into the original gait sequence. A temporal mask is employed to control the sparsity of the adversarial frames. The most related to our task is the adversarial attack on action recognition [Wei et al., 2018] . A similar mask-based method is applied to control the sparsity. Besides, Chen et al.propose a new adversarial attack that appends a few dummy frames to a video clip and then adds adversarial perturbations only on these new frames [Chen et al., 2019] . Both the methods focus on the norm-bounded perturbation and need to tune the hyperparameters in the objective. In our task, we relax the constraint of perturbations and simplify our objective to omit the tuning.
Methodology

Problem formulation
Let X ∈ R N ×W ×H×C denote a clean silhouette sequence, and X * ∈ R N ×W ×H×C denote its adversarial sequence, where N is the number of frames, W, H, C are the width, height, and channel for a specific frame, respectively.
The non-targeted adversarial sequence X * is the solution of the following objective function:
where λ is a constant to balance the two terms in the objective. f is a gait recognition model that outputs the computed features of silhouette sequences. L cos is the loss function to measure the cosine similarity between the ground truth sequence and the adversarial sequence. C(X, X * ) is a distortion measurement to evaluate the difference between the original sequence and its adversarial sequence. For perturbationbased attack, it is often defined as the l p norm X * − X p . For our attack, we define a new measurement as
where o is the oracle to decide whether the image is a reasonable gait silhouette and similar to its counterpart. As unrestricted adversarial examples [Brown et al., 2018] , the adversarial frames in our attack are expected to maintain a gait appearance though may have a large perturbation on pixellevel. Φ is a subset within the set of frame indices.
Temporal Sparse Attack
In our new measurement (2), the supervision of the oracle is of vital importance to improve the imperceptibility in the spatial domain, but causing the objective Eq.(1) hard to optimize. Thus, we use a well trained generator to craft adversarial frames as [Poursaeed et al., 2019] did. The pipeline of our attack is shown in Fig. 2 .
To control the temporal sparsity, similar to [Wei et al., 2018] , we denote the temporal mask as M ∈ {0, 1} N ×W ×H×C . We let Ω = {1, 2, ..., N } be the set of frame indices, Φ be a subset within Ω having K elements randomly sampled from Ω, and Ψ = Ω − Φ. If n ∈ Φ, we set M n = 0, and if n ∈ Ψ, M n = 1, where M n ∈ {0, 1} W ×H×C is the n-th frame in M . Thus the sparsity is computed as S = K/N . Denote the latent variables inputted into the generator as Z ∈ R N ×V , where V is the dimension of each latent variable. Z is initialized by randomly sampling from the standard Gaussian distribution. G is a pre-trained generator on a gait silhouette dataset. Thus the adversarial sequence is obtained by
We name this method as an frame-alteration attack. Instead of modifying a few frames, an frame-insertion attack inserts a few frames into the original sequence to obtain the adversarial sequence X * ∈ R (N +∆N )×W ×H×C . For the well trained generator G, all the generated images G(Z) should be classified by the oracle as gait silhouettes, which means C(X, X * ) = 0. Thus the objective in Eq.(1) can be simplified as
By performing gradient ascent on Eq.(4) in the latent variable spaces of the generator, the corresponding Z that maximizes the cosine loss can be found. Without loss of generality, we adopt the MIFGSM [Dong et al., 2017 ] to attack f as follows.
where µ is the decay factor, is the step size and t means the t-th iteration. Algorithm 1 shows the proposed temporal sparse adversarial attack.
Experiments
Setup
The dataset we conduct experiments on is CASIA-B [Yu et al., 2006] . CASIA-B is a widely used gait dataset that contains 124 subjects(labeled 001-124) with 11 different viewing angles and ten sequences per subject for each view. The 10 sequences contain three walking conditions: 6 sequences are in the normal walking state(NM 1-6), two sequences contain walking subject wearing coats(CL 1-2) and two sequences
Algorithm 1 Temporal Sparse Adversarial Attack
Input: A gait recognition model f ; a generator G; a silhouette sequence X; iterations T and decay factor µ; sparsity S; step size
Output: An adversarial silhouette sequence X * . 1: g0 = 0; X * 0 = X; Z0 ∼ Gaussian(0, 1). 2: Compute the mask M according to the sparsity S, details are in the text; 3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do 4:
Input Zt into the generator G and obtain the images G(Zt); 5:
Compute the adversarial sequence as
Compute the cosine similarity loss of two sequences features as Lcos(f (X), f (X * t )); 7:
Update g (t+1) by accumulating the velocity vector in the gradient direction as Eq.(5); 8:
Update Z (t+1) by applying the clipped gradient as Eq.(6); 9: end for 10: return X * = M · G(ZT ) + (1 − M ) · X.
contain subject carrying bags(BG 1-2). The whole dataset is used to train the WGAN-GP. We use the trained generator for attack and set the dimension of inputted latent variables as V = 128.
The threat model is GaitSet, the state-of-the-art gait recognition model. GaitSet regards gait as a set of gait silhouettes and utilizes the deep neural network to directly extract temporal information during training. Moreover, GaitSet is flexible since the input set can contain any number of non-consecutive silhouettes. Thus for the mask M, we let the set Φ to be Φ = {1, 2, ..., K}, which means we simply alter the first K frames with adversarial ones. K is computed according to the needed sparsity.
Since GaitSet is trained on the first 74 subjects(labeled 1-74) and tested on the rest 50 subjects, we follow this setting to attack the last 50 subjects(labeled 75-124). For each subject, the first 4 sequences of the NM condition (NM 1-4) are kept in the gallery to test the recognition accuracy. All frames in a specific view and walking condition are used as a sequence for the test. Our attack is based on MIFGSM, the hyperparameters are set as follows: the iterations are 100, µ = 1.0 in Eq.(5), = 0.1 in Eq.(6). 
Results
The accuracy of GaitSet under our proposed attack is shown in Fig.3 , where the accuracy is averaged on the 11 gallery views and the identical views are excluded. For example, the accuracy of the probe view 90 • is averaged on 10 gallery views, excluding gallery view 90 • . In (a) we show that our attacks with different sparsity successfully fool GaitSet, causing low accuracy in all three walking conditions. Moreover, the attack success rate is positively correlated with sparsity, which means that a stronger attack needs more modified frames in a sequence. Even though, the accuracy drops more than 68.2% when the sparsity is 1/40. To further prove the drop performance is caused by our designed attack rather than altering some frames with randomly chosen gait silhouettes, we compare two situations: (1) Random. The latent variable z is randomly sampled from a standard Gaussian distribution.
(2) Adversary. The latent variable z is obtained by our adversarial attack. As shown in (b)(c)(d), Random only slightly affects the accuracy of GaitSet, while Adversary has more severe damage on the recognition performance, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our attack. One intriguing phenomenon is that whether Random or Adversary has a more obvious effect on the accuracy when the view angle is close to 0 • or 180 • , which is hardly recognizable. It it still a challenge case for most of the state-of-the-art gait recognition methods.
We extend the experiments to the frame-insertion attack setting and obtain similar results in Fig.4 . We also perform the perturbation-based attack on each frame with MIFGSM [Dong et al., 2017] for comparison. The perturbation of each frame is restricted to a L inf norm bound = 0.1, with the pixel value within [0,1]. As shown in Fig.1 , the perturbation is notable, compared with the proposed temporal sparse adversarial attack.
In the experiments above, our attack obtains a high attack success rate and good imperceptibility on the silhouette frame level. Besides the imperceptibility on the temporal dimension, we also list some adversarial examples crafted by our attack in Fig.5 to show the imperceptibility on the spatial dimension. However, due to the capacity of the trained generator, some generated adversarial examples are away from the normal distribution of gait silhouette. Some low-quality images are also presented in Fig.5 . Even though, most ad-versarial examples are well generated. Moreover, our attack achieves high temporal sparsity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel temporal sparse adversarial attack on gait recognition. The new attack achieves good imperceptibility and a high attack success rate. Experiments on CASIA-B dataset have indicated that the state-ofthe-art model, GaitSet, is vulnerable to our adversarial attack, showing a great emergency in adversarial robustness research on gait recognition. We mainly focus on high-quality gait silhouettes, instead of RGB gait images, generation for adversarial attacks in this paper. Actually, gait silhouette frames can be easily transferred to the source video frames with a generator like the StyleGAN [Karras et al., 2019] , which is left for our future work. It is also easy to transplant our proposed approach to the targeted or black-box attack.
